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Wills/Constitutional Law-FLORIDA'S SUPREME COURT STRIKES THE
STATE'S MORTMAIN STATUTE AS UNcoNsTITuTioNAL-Shriners
Hospitals for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1990).
MARK E. KAPLAN
T HE Florida Supreme Court recently struck the state's 57-year-old
mortmain statute, section 732.803,2 on grounds that it violated
both the federal and state constitutions.3 Previously, Florida was one
of only five American jurisdictions that had valid mortmain statutes
in effect. 4 The primary intent of these modem mortmain statutes has
been to protect the families of testators from improvident gifts by
their decedents. The statutes have attempted to achieve this purpose
either by limiting the amount of the testator's estate that may be left
to charity or by setting a minimum amount of time that must elapse
between the execution of the will and the death of the testator. This
second type of restriction is intended to prevent death bed bequests to
1. See Ch. 16103, § 20, Laws of Fla. (1933)(enacting predecessor to section 732.803).
2. FLA. STAT. § 732.803 (1989) provides:
(1) If a testator dies leaving lineal descendants or a spouse and his will devises part or
all of the testator's estate:
(a) To a benevolent, charitable, educational, literary, scientific, religious, or mis-
sionary institution, corporation, association, or purpose,
(b) To this state, any other state or country, or a county, city, or town in this or
any other state or country, or
(c) To a person in trust for any such purpose or beneficiary, whether or not the
trust appears on the face of the instrument making the devise, the devise shall be
avoided in its entirety if one or more of the lineal descendants or a spouse who
would receive any interest in the devise, if avoided, files written notice to this
effect in the administration proceeding within 4 months after the date letters are
issued, unless:
(d) The will was duly executed at least 6 months before the testator's death, or
(e) The testator made a valid charitable devise in substantially the same amount
for the same purpose or to the same beneficiary, or to a person in trust for the
same purpose or beneficiary, as was made in the last will or by a will or a series of
wills duly executed immediately next to the last will, one of which was executed
more than 6 months before the testator's death.
(2) The testator's making of a codicil that does not substantially change a charitable
devise as herein defined within the 6-month period before the testator's death shall not
render the charitable gift voidable under this section.
3. Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1990).
4. The others are Georgia, Idaho, Mississippi, and the Virgin Islands. See infra notes 29-
33 and accompanying text. The Florida Supreme Court in Zrillic does not include the Virgin
Islands in its list of those jurisdictions with valid mortmain statutes, but it speaks in terms of
states, not jurisdictions. Zriihic, 563 So. 2d at 69 n.5.
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charity where the testator's decision may be largely a result of a fear
of impending death.'
This Note examines the history and purpose of these statutes and
their historic predecessors and how the various states have addressed
the constitutional issues raised by the mortmain statutes. 6 The Florida
law and the supreme court's recent decision in Zrillic will then be dis-
cussed in light of how other courts, including earlier Florida courts,
have resolved the issues raised by the mortmain statutes. Finally, some
of the future implications of the Zrillic decision will be briefly dis-
cussed.
I. HISTORicAL BACKGROUND OF MORTMAIN STATUTES
As time has passed the purpose of the mortmain statutes has
changed. There have been two distinct classes of mortmain statutes:
those which existed in feudal times and those which are recognized as
the modern mortmain laws.
A. Feudal Origins
As with many other property concepts, the original mortmain sta-
tutes arose in feudal England. 7 They were created, in part, to resolve
an increasing tension between the Crown, through its feudal over-
lords, and the Church.8 Giving to the Church became a popular means
of easing the giver's conscience and provided additional hope for sal-
vation.9 However, this practice created considerable problems for the
overlords, who were largely dependent on the feudal incidents of re-
lief, 0 wardship," marriage, 2 and escheat. 3
5. W. McGovERN, JR., S. KuRTz & J. REIN, WiLus, TRUSTS & ESTATES § 3.11 (1988).
6. Technically, the modern statutes are not actually mortmain statutes. The mortmain sta-
tutes were those that placed direct restrictions on the power of religious organizations and other
corporations to hold property. The modern statutes regulate a testator's ability to make charita-
ble devises and do not, as a general rule, limit the ability of charitable organizations to hold
property. However, these modern statutes are still referred to as mortmain statutes. See 4A A.
ScoTt & W. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUST& § 362 (4th ed. 1989).
7. Hornstein, Corporate Control and Private Property Rules, 92 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 11-16
(1943).
8. D. SUTHERLAND, THE ASSIZE OF NOVEL DissEIsiN 88-90 (1973).
9. Bomes, The Dead Hand: The Last Grasp?, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 351, 352 (1976).
10. Relief was a sum payable to the lord upon the death of the tenant. The tenant's heirs
had to pay this sum before the inheritance could be taken. J. DUKE1.NIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY
151 (2d ed. 1988).
11. Wardship was the right of the lord to act as guardian of the infant heir and the lands to
be inherited by that heir. The lord was entitled to the profits from the land until the male heir
reached 21 or the female heir reached 16, and the lord was only obligated to provide sustenance
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These feudal incidents, which enriched the lord, matured upon the
tenant 14 either dying, getting married, or committing a felony. How-
ever, the Church could never do any of these things, thus leaving the
overlord with no incidents to be had with respect to church-owned
lands. 5 As the lords began to suffer financially, their complaints to
the King increased, culminating in the Statute of Mortmain of 1279.16
This statute prohibited religious organizations from holding land in
dead hand 17 control without the consent of the overlord. If a tenant
granted lands into dead hand control, the immediate superior lord,
whose rights of enrichment would be lost, was allowed a full year to
enter and oust the grantees and hold the land by virtue of this forfei-
ture.' 8
Since this was royal legislation, the Crown had the right to dispense
of this law.' 9 Therefore, the Crown could give permission to the ten-
ant to convey land to the church, typically for a fee to the Crown. 20
Because this evoked much protest from the lords, in 1292 the Crown
agreed not to give these licenses unless the immediate superior lord
had previously granted consent.2' While this allowed for adequate pro-
for the heir and to not commit waste upon the land. Id. at 150-151; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1420 (5th ed. 1979).
12. When the lord was guardian for a minor heir, he had the right to sell the heir in mar-
riage. If the heir refused a suitable marriage, the heir had to pay a fee to the lord. J. DuXEm-
NIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 151 (2d ed. 1988).
13. Escheat allowed the lord to retake the tenant's land if the tenant died without heirs or
committed a felony. Id.; D. SuTRLAwD, THE Assize oF NovEL DtssEsIN 88 (1973); 2 A. ScoTr
& W. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRusTs § 96.2 (4th ed. 1987).
14. It is important to note that the tenancies of feudal times were significantly different
than our modem notion of tenancy in the landlord/tenant context. The feudal tenants typically
held freehold estates in fee simple, the status that is usually associated with modem property
ownership. J. Du maN & J. KaRi, PROPERTY 157 (2d ed. 1988).
15. D. SuTHERLAND, TH AssIE oF Novm. DIsszisIN 88 (1973); 2 A. Scor & W.
FRATCHER, TH LAW OF TRUSTS § 96.2 (4th ed. 1987).
16. Hornstein, Corporate Control and Private Property Rules, 92 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 12
(1943); 7 Edw. 1, ch. 748 (1279). The statute provided:
That no person, Religious or other, whatsoever he be that will, buy or sell any Lands
or Tenements, or under the Colour of Gift or Lease, or that will receive by reason of
any other Title, whatsoever it be, Lands or Tenements, or by any other Craft or En-
gine will presume to appropre to himself under Pain of Forfeiture of the same,
whereby such Lands or Tenements may any wise come into Mortmain.
17. The statute stated its purpose to be the prevention of lands passing "ad manum mor-
tuam," literally meaning "to the dead hand," and thus giving rise to the current term "mort-
main." W. McGovE, S. KuaTZ & J. REni, WnitS, TRusTs AND ESTATES § 3.11 (1988);
Hornstein, Corporate Control and Private Property Rules, 92 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1943).
18. 7 Edw. 1, ch. 7 (1279).
19. D. SuTHAND, THE Assize O NovEL Dissmsn 94 (1973).
20. Id. at 94-95.
21. Id. at 95.
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tection of the interests of the overlords, the donor's heirs had no rem-
edy in the event their decedent unlawfully alienated property,
depriving them of any rights of inheritance which would have other-
wise been had, subject to the payment of relief.2
Because other corporations had the same immortal qualities en-
joyed by churches, the mortmain statutes were later extended to in-
clude these corporations. 2 This inclusion of entities other than
churches was a significant change in the focus of the mortmain sta-
tutes. The interests of the lords were being better protected, but at the
expense of more entities than just the Church. That religious organi-
zations were no longer singled out was a quality carried over in most
of the modern mortmain statutes that regulated gifts to all charitable
organizations and not just churches.2 However, since the Church also
had considerable power in feudal England, along with the Crown,
these statutes were continually modified, reflecting the balancing of
powers between the Church and the Crown.2
B. Mortmain in America
The forerunner of the American mortmain statutes was The Mort-
main Act of 1736.26 This Act required that all charitable gifts and con-
veyances be evidenced by deed executed before two witnesses at least
twelve months before the death of the donor, and recorded within six
months of its execution. 27 However, none of the English mortmain
statutes were received as part of the common law; therefore, such pro-
visions are only present in America where they have been enacted by
state statute.
28
At least twelve American jurisdictions29 have had mortmain30 sta-
tutes during this century. However, now that Florida's statute has
22. W. McGovERN, S. KURTZ & J. REIN, Wias, TRUSTS & ESTATES § 3.11 (1988); see supra
note 11.
23. Bomes, The Dead Hand: The Last Grasp?, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 351, 352 (1976) (citing
15 Rich. 2, ch. 5 (1391)).
24. A notable exception was the District of Columbia's mortmain statute. See D.C. CODE
ANN. § 18-302 (1973).
25. Bomes, The Dead Hand: The Last Grasp?, 28 U. FLA. L. Rv. 351, 353 (1976). This
balancing is no longer necessary in England as the mortmain statutes were eventually repealed in
1960. Stebbings, The Commercial Application of the Law of Mortmain, 10 J. LEGAL HIST. 37,
39, 43 (1989).
26. 9 Geo. 2, ch. 36 (1736).
27. Id.
28. 2 A. ScOTT & W. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 96.2 (4th ed. 1987); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 362 comment a (1959).
29. California, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Mississippi, Montana,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virgin Islands. See infra notes 31-33.
30. See supra note 6.
FLORIDA'S MORTMAIN STATUTE
been declared unconstitutional, only four of those jurisdictions still
have valid mortmain statutes in effect.3 Others have been repealed by
the state legislatures3 2 or declared unconstitutional by the state
courts.
33
The intent of these modern mortmain acts is significantly different
from that of the original feudal acts. The feudal acts were intended to
protect the feudal system by limiting the real property held by
churches and other corporations 34 incapable of providing feudal inci-
dents. The modern acts, on the other hand, have been primarily in-
tended to protect the families of those who make testamentary gifts to
charitable organizations. The modern statutes attempt to protect the
testator's family either by limiting the percentage of a testator's estate
that may be bequeathed to charity or by setting a minimum time be-
fore the death of the testator that such bequests must be made.3 6
Presumably, the limits on the maximum amount that may be be-
queathed are primarily intended to protect the testator's family in the
event they have been inadequately provided for elsewhere.3 7 Statutes
that set a minimum time before the death of the testator that such
charitable bequests must be made are primarily intended to prevent
death bed bequests by those who may be more susceptible to pleas
from over-reaching charities because of the fear of impending death. 3
A fear is that religious organizations may otherwise prey on persons
31. Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-10 (1982); Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 15-2-615 (1979); Mis-
sissippi: MISs. CONST. Art. 14, § 270 & MIss. CODE ANN. § 91-5-31 (1972 & Supp. 1990); and
Virgin Islands: V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 9 (1964).
32. California: CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 40 to 43, repealed by 1971 Cal. Stat. 1395; Iowa: IOWA
CODE § 633.266, repealed by 1980 IowA AcTS 1064 § 2; New York: N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS
LAW § 5-3.3, repealed by 1981 N.Y. LAWS 461.
33. District of Columbia: D.C. CODE ANN. § 18-302, declared unconstitutional in Estate of
French v. Doyle, 365 A.2d 621 (D.C. 1976); Florida: FLA. STAT. § 732.803, declared unconstitu-
tional in Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1990); Montana:
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-11-334, declared unconstitutional in In re Estate of Kinyon, 615 P.2d
174 (Mont. 1980); Ohio: Omao REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.06, declared unconstitutional, after re-
peal effective August 1, 1985, in Shriners' Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Hester, 23 Ohio St. 3d
198, 492 N.E.2d 153 (1986); Pennsylvania: 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2507(1), declared unconstitu-
tional in In re Estate of Riley, 459 Pa. 428, 329 A.2d 511 (1974) and In re Estate of Cavill, 459
Pa. 411, 329 A.2d 503 (1974).
34. An example of this type of corporation was a trading company. Stebbings, The Com-
mercialApplication of the Law of Mortmain, 10 J. LE . HIST. 37, 39 (1989).
35. Annotation, Modern Status: Validity and Effect of Mortmain Statutes, 6 A.L.R.4th
603, 609 (1981).
Mississippi's constitution and mortmain statute are notable exceptions to this rule, as they do,
in fact, also place limitations on a charity's ability to hold property. MIss. CONST. art. 14, § 270;
Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-5-31 (Supp. 1990).
36. RESTATEmNT (SEcoND) oF TRUSTS § 362 comments b & c (1959).
37. Bomes, The Dead Hand: The Last Grasp?, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 351, 355 (1976).
38. W. McGovERN, S. KurTz & J. REiN, WmLlS, TRUSTS & ESTATES § 3.11 (1988).
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on their death-bed.39 The protection of persons attempting to buy sal-
vation during their final days has been an additional justification at-
tributed to these acts.40 Obviously, it is more likely that those
mortmain statutes that set a minimum time before the death of the
testator that charitable bequests must be made serve this purpose bet-
ter.
The manner in which these modern statutes operate is also different
from that of the feudal statutes, reflecting the different concerns to
which the modern statutes are addressed. 4' The feudal statutes regu-
lated all transfers of real property to churches and corporations. 42 The
modern statutes speak only to testamentary transfers. 43 Thus, inter vi-
vos transfers that would have been invalid under the feudal statutes
are not addressed by the modern laws.
The statutes are not entirely effective in protecting the testator's
family because there are numerous ways for the provisions of the sta-
tutes to be avoided. 44 For example, the statutes do not regulate inter
vivos transfers. Thus, a person might give virtually her entire estate to
charitable organizations up to the moment of death and, assuming no
unlawful coercion or duress, the donor's family may not be ade-
quately supported. 45 Additionally, careful drafting, such as naming a
friend or collateral heir as residuary legatee, frequently will enable the
testator's wishes to be honored, thereby possibly leaving the family
without adequate support. 46 Because the statutes are so easily evaded,
one commentator has said that "such restrictions serve little public
purpose, and are mainly liability traps for attorneys." 47
The state legislatures have enacted three basic types of modern
mortmain statutes. They have enacted those that limit the amount of
39. Note, Mortmain Statutes: Questions of Constitutionality, 52 NoTRE DAME LAW. 638,
639 (1977).
40. See Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 69 (Fla. 1990). See
also Bomes, supra note 37, at 356.
41. Bomes, supra note 37, at 351, 354, 357.
42. Id. at 354.
43. Id. at 357.
44. See W. McGovRN, S. KuRTz & J. REIN, supra note 38, § 3.11.
45. However, assuming that self-impoverishment is contrary to human nature, it is unlikely
that this would occur because people typically do not know when they will die.
46. This is so because a voided charitable bequest would pass through the residuary clause
of the will. Florida's mortmain statute has been interpreted to allow family members to chal-
lenge a charitable bequest only when they stand to benefit from its avoidance. Because the fam-
ily members would take nothing where someone not named in the statute is named as residuary
legatee, no one would have standing to challenge the bequest, and it would therefore stand. See
infra notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
47. Dukeminier, Cleansing the Stables of Property: A River Found at Last, 65 IowA L.
Rv. 151, 173 (1979).
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testamentary devise that may be given to charity, 48 those that specify a
minimum amount of time that must elapse between the execution of
the will and the death of the testator, 49 and those that contain both
types of restrictions."0 Statutes that have set a maximum amount that
may be devised to charity have typically spoken in terms of a percent-
age of the testator's total estate and have applied where the testator is
survived by close relatives.5 These statutes have generally invalidated
only the amount by which the bequest exceeded the statutory maxi-
mum. 2 Those statutes that have required that a specified time elapse
between the preparation of the will and the death of the testator have
usually set the period at between one and six months.53 Statutes that
have set both requirements have merely combined the characteristics
of both in various ways. 4
There are, however, problems with all the modern mortmain sta-
tutes because they do not adequately serve their intended purposes."
As noted earlier, careful drafting can allow a testator to defeat the
statute and have the charitable bequests stand.5 6 Additionally, the sta-
tutes may be overly broad in that they allow the testator's heirs to
invalidate charitable bequests where the testator made those bequests
after much thought and with no undue coercion.57 Furthermore, it ap-
pears arbitrary and irrational that the right of a person to disinherit
heirs should be unduly restricted if that decision is rationally made by
a person capable of making such decisions.58 Finally, the invalidation
of bequests made too close to the death of the testator may not actu-
48. The mortmain statutes of Iowa, New York, and the Virgin Islands have all been of this
type. See supra notes 31-33.
49. The mortmain statutes of the District of Columbia, Florida, Mississippi, Montana, and
Pennsylvania have all been of this type. See supra notes 31-33.
50. The mortmain statutes of California, Georgia, Idaho, and Ohio have all been of this
type. See supra notes 31-33.
51. Iowa: 25% of the total estate; New York: 500 of the total estate; Virgin Islands: 50%
of the total estate. See supra notes 31-33.
52. See supra notes 31-33 & 51.
53. District of Columbia: 30 days; Florida: 6 months; Idaho: will must be executed at least
120 days before the death of the testator unless the death is caused by an accident; Mississippi:
180 days, and the charity must dispose of the property within 10 years; Montana: 30 days; Penn-
sylvania: 30 days. See supra notes 31-33.
54. California: bequest must be made at least 30 days before testator's death but even if
made before then may still not exceed one-third of the total estate; Georgia: maximum charitable
devise of one-third of the estate unless the will is executed at least 90 days before the death of the
testator; Ohio: if executed within six months of the death of the testator, the charitable devise
may not exceed 25% of the estate. See supra notes 31-33.
55. W. McGovERN, S. KuRTz & J. RErN, supra note 38, § 3.11.
56. Id.
57. Estate of Kinyon, 615 P.2d 174, 176 (Mont. 1980).
58. Id.
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ally further the intent of the mortmain statutes. Such a provision, in
effect, creates an irrebuttable presumption that any bequest made
close to death must have been unduly influenced by the testator's fear
of impending death.59 This presumption is frequently untrue and fails
to account for gifts to charities where a testator is aged and suffering
from a terminal illness but happens to survive the execution of his or
her will by a certain amount of time.60 Moreover, where such a provi-
sion applies even when the testator is killed in an accident, as did Flor-
ida's mortmain statute, the results may be wholly irrational.
II. How OmER COURTS HAVE FOUND MORTMAIN
STATUTES UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Other than Florida, at least four states have held their mortmain
statutes to be unconstitutional .6 The arguments most often successful
and most generally applicable to other mortmain statutes are that the
statutes violate the equal protection and due process clauses of the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.6 2
A. Equal Protection
The equal protection clause has been most often cited by courts as
justification for invalidating mortmain statutes.63 Generally, the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has been interpreted
by the United States Supreme Court to require that varying classifica-
tion or treatment of people must be based on criteria reasonably re-
lated to a legitimate state purpose." "A classification 'must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of differ-
ence having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legisla-
tion, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike."' 65
The equal protection problem with the mortmain statutes is that
they create two classes of testators and two classes of beneficiaries,
59. Shriners' Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Hester, 23 Ohio St. 3d 198, 202, 492 N.E.2d
153, 156 (1986).
60. Id. at 202-203, 442 N.E.2d at 156-157.
61. See supra note 33.
62. "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due proc-
ess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
63. See Shriners' Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Hester, 23 Ohio St. 3d 198, 203-204, 492
N.E.2d 153, 157 (1986); In re Estate of Kinyon, 615 P.2d 174, 176 (Mont. 1980); Estate of
French v. Doyle, 365 A.2d 621, 623 (D.C. 1976); In re Estate of Riley, 459 Pa. 428, 431, 329
A.2d 511, 513 (1974); In re Estate of Cavill, 459 Pa. 411, 414, 329 A.2d 503, 506 (1974).
64. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
65. Id. (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
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the creation of which has been held to lack a reasonable relationship
to the purpose of the statutes." The problem with the categories is
that the distinction is typically based solely on when the testator hap-
pened to die or on whether the beneficiary was a charitable or non-
charitable entity, regardless of any influence that may have been ex-
erted on the testator. 67
B. Due Process
The due process arguments, as applied to the minimum time before
death statutes, have hinged on the irrebuttable presumption created
when a charitable bequest is found to be in violation of the state's
mortmain statute." The irrebuttable presumption created is that a be-
quest that was executed too close to the testator's death has been un-
duly influenced or made without adequate consideration.69 Since this
presumption is not "necessarily or universally true in fact," it is viola-
tive of due process to establish such an irrebuttable presumption."
The District of Columbia's mortmain statute was invalidated partially
on this ground .7 However, it does not appear that future courts are
likely to use this argument as grounds to invalidate other mortmain
statutes, because the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, as applied to
situations such as this, has been largely abandoned as it has become
clear that its underlying arguments actually relied on an equal protec-
tion, rather than a due process, rationale.72 Thus, the same basic anal-
66. Hester, 23 Ohio St. 3d at 203, 492 N.E.2d at 157; Kinyon, 615 P.2d at 176; Estate of
French, 365 A.2d at 624; Cavill, 459 Pa. at 411, 329 A.2d at 506.
67. See infra notes 159-167 and accompanying text for a more extensive discussion of the
equal protection issue.
The courts have also addressed the establishment of categories affecting inheritance with re-
gard to statutes limiting the inheritance rights of illegitimate children. See e.g., Trimble v. Gor-
don, 430 U.S. 762, 774 (1977) (holding an Illinois statute unconstitutional on grounds that it
violated the equal protection clause because it did not reasonably promote a legitimate state
interest); see also In re Estate of Burris, 361 So. 2d 152, 155 (Fla. 1978) (reaching the same
holding as to Florida's statute).
68. Estate of French, 365 A.2d at 624; Note, Mortmain Statutes: Questions of Constitu-
tionality, 52 Nomxa DAME LAW. 638, 643 (1977).
69. Id.
70. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973); Hester, 23 Ohio St. at 202, 492 N.E.2d at
156.
71. Estate of French, 365 A.2d at 623.
72. By masking substantive decisions in procedural language, the Supreme Court, in
the irrebuttable presumption cases, confused due process and equal protection analy-
sis. Irrebuttable presumption analysis allowed the Court to overturn legislative deci-
sions without having to justify the use of judicial power as would an open use of
substantive due process or equal protection analysis. The use of irrebuttable presump-
tion language was a conceptually confused, if not dishonest, method of justifying in-
dependent judicial review of legislative classifications. The declining use of
19911
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ysis will be conducted using equal protection arguments, eliminating
the need to engage in this perhaps intellectually dishonest irrebuttable
presumption analysis.73
III. THE HISTORY OF FLORIDA'S MORTMAIN STATUTE
The Florida legislature enacted the state's mortmain statute, invali-
dating charitable devises where the testator dies within six months of
the execution of the will and is survived by a spouse or lineal heirs, in
1933.74
A. Early Interpretations
The first case to construe Florida's mortmain statute was Taylor v.
Payne.7 In Taylor the Florida Supreme Court established much of the
interpretive framework on which future decisions would be built. As
part of that framework, the court enunciated the intent of the Florida
statute:
Our statute is not a mortmain act. The legislature never intended
by the enactment of the statute to place any restriction upon the right
of benevolent, charitable, educational, or religious institutions to
take and hold property; but only to place a limitation upon the right
of testators to dispose of their property to such institutions when the
conditions that are detailed in the statute exist. The purpose of the
statute is clear: it is to protect the widow and children from
improvident gifts made to their neglect by the testator; the design of
the statute being obviously to prevent testators who may be laboring
under the apprehension of impending death from disposing of their
estates to the exclusion of those who are, or should be, the natural
objects of the testator's bounty.76
This statement of intent has helped to shape the mortmain decisions
of the Florida courts. Although the court questioned the wisdom of
the statute,7 7 it consistently applied the law in light of this statement of
intent.
irrebuttable presumption analysis may evidence increasing willingness of justices to
address directly the judicial role in reviewing legislatively created classifications.
J. NowAK, R. RoTuNDA & J. YOUNO, CONsTrrTIoNAL LAw 483 (3d ed. 1986).
73. Id.
74. Ch. 16103, § 20, Laws of Fla. (1933).
75. 154 Fla. 359, 17 So. 2d 615, 618 (1944) ("This is a case of first impression in this
jurisdiction.").
76. Id. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; supra note 35 and accompanying text.
77. "Whether the legislative philosophy behind such enactment is sound may be debata-
ble." Taylor, 154 Fla. at 359, 17 So. 2d at 618.
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Another key decision made by the court in Taylor was that testa-
mentary devises that are contrary to the mortmain statute are not au-
tomatically void, but are voidable "at the election of the spouse, or
children, blood or adopted, or their lineal descendants." 78 This deter-
mination was important in that it provided a means by which the tes-
tator's heirs could waive their rights to challenge the bequest. 79 This
holding is consistent with the court's reading of the intent of the stat-
ute to include the prevention of "private wrongs" against the testa-
tor's family as opposed to the prevention of "public wrongs" against
society as a whole.8°
This case of first impression on the interpretation of Florida's mort-
main statute also presented the first opportunity for Florida's Su-
preme Court to address the constitutionality of the statute. The
appellants alleged that "the statute is violative of the organic law in
that it deprives the testator and the legatees of the right to receive,
enjoy and dispose of property without due process of law, and denies
them the equal protection of the law in the acquisition and disposition
of property." 8' The court was not persuaded, however. In a passage
that would later be vacated in Zrillic, the court held that there are no
guarantees of the right to receive or dispose of property by will in
either the federal or state constitutions. The court stated:
Therefore, the right of testamentary disposition of property does not
emanate from the organic law, as contended by counsel, but is a
creature of the law derived solely from statute without constitutional
limitation. Accordingly, the right is at all times subject to regulation
and control by the legislative authority which creates it. The
authority which confers the right may impose conditions thereon,
such as limiting disposition to a particular class or fixing the time
which must ensue subsequent to the execution of the will before gifts
to a particular class shall be deemed valid; or the right to dispose of
property by will may be taken away altogether, if deemed necessary,
without private or constitutional rights of the citizen being thereby
violated.82
After the Taylor decision, it seemed as though the Florida Supreme
Court would not be at all receptive to future challenges to the consti-
tutionality of the state's mortmain statute.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 618-19.
80. Id. at 618.
81. Id. at 617.
82. Id.
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The next case that brought the state's mortmain statute before the
Florida Supreme Court was In re Estate of Pratt.3 The facts of this
case presented a situation where it was clear that the testator's charita-
ble devise was not influenced by his imminent death. Instead, the tes-
tator had made identical charitable bequests in a will executed more
than six months before his death. Then, three days before his death,
the testator executed a new will that contained the same charitable
bequests as the previous will.84 This will expressly revoked all prior
wills and codicils. 85
When the testator's heirs sued to invalidate the charitable bequests,
the charitable organizations defended by saying that the new will
merely reiterated a dispositive scheme enacted more than six months
before the testator's death.86 The court, however, was not persuaded,
and allowed the charitable devise to be voided by the testator's heirs.
The court reasoned that even though the gift did not violate the legis-
lative intent to protect against improvident bequests by those faced
with impending death, and despite the policy of "giving as much ef-
fect as possible to the intention of the testator insofar as it is not in-
consistent with some settled rule of law or public policy," the plain
language of the statute required holding the gift voidable."
The court stated that, "[t]he statutory coverage is much more com-
prehensive than its apparent purpose would warrant[.]" 8 However,
the court also noted that "the restriction of its scope is a problem for
the legislature. '"89 This argument was revisited by the court in later
years in the context of equal protection challenges to the statute. 9°
The court in Pratt rejected the argument that the doctrine of de-
pendent relative revocation should be applied. 9' This doctrine is used
by courts to revive a bequest thought to be revoked by a subsequent
instrument. It is invoked where the testator has made the subsequent
revocation on the basis of a mistake of fact or law and where the
intent of the testator is clear enough to allow the court to determine
that the testator would have rather had the previous bequest stand if
key parts of the subsequent bequest were invalidated. 92 The court de-
83. 88 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1956).
84. Id. at 500.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 501.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children-,v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 70 (Fla. 1990).
91. 88 So. 2d at 504.
92. Warren, Dependent Relative Revocation, 33 HFv. L. REv. 337 (1920).
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clined to apply this doctrine because of, among other things, a sup-
posed lack of clear intent from the testator. 93 By refusing to apply this
doctrine, the court pushed the balance of interests further in favor of
the testator's family to the detriment of the charitable organizations
and the intent of the testator. 94
In response to the decision in Pratt, the Legislature amended the
mortmain statute to prevent situations where the reenactment of a
prior charitable devise acts to actually invalidate that testamentary
gift." The amendment provided that a charitable devise in a will exe-
cuted within six months of the testator's death would be valid where
the testator's
will duly executed immediately next prior to such last will and more
than six months before his death, made a valid charitable bequest or
devise in substantially the same amount for the same purpose or to
the same beneficiary, or to a person in trust for the same person or
beneficiary as was made in such last will. The making of a codicil
within the six-months period before testator's death, which codicil
does not substantially change a charitable devise or bequest as herein
defined, shall not render such charitable gift ineffective under this
section.96
However, the clear intent of the legislature was again disregarded in
favor of a strict reading of the statute in In re Estate of Blankenship.97
There, the testator had enacted two wills within six months of her
death, each of which contained substantially the same charitable be-
quests as her third to the last will, executed more than six months
before her death. In overturning the district court of appeal, 98 the
Florida Supreme Court relied on the strict language of the amended
statute. As the next prior will of the testator was not executed more
93. Pratt, 88 So. 2d at 501-505.
94. This would have been an atypical application of the doctrine of dependent relative revo-
cation. Usually, it is applied where the testator commits an act to revoke the will, such as tearing
it up, instead of where, as here, the revocation occurs through a subsequent instrument. J. Du-
EMIUNER & S. JoRANsoN, Wni.s, TRUSTS, & EsTATEs 236 (4th ed. 1990).
95. See In re Estate of Blankenship, 114 So. 2d 519, 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959) ("Coming as
it did at the next legislative session following the Pratt decision, the amendment obviously pur-
ports to mitigate the severity of the then existing statute.").
96. Ch.57-243, § 1, 1957 Fla. Laws 461. The mortmain statute was still numbered section
731.19 at the time of the amendment. When a major overhaul of the probate code was under-
taken in 1974, the section was renumbered to its present 732.803. Ch. 74-106, 1974 Fla. Laws
212-213, 232-233.
97. 122 So. 2d 466, 470 (Fla. 1960).
98. In re Estate of Blankenship, 114 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959), rev'd, 122 So. 2d 466
(1960).
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than six months before the death of the testator, the charitable be-
quest was not allowed to stand. Thus, because the testator had reiter-
ated her charitable devise twice during the last six months of her life,
instead of only the one time that the supreme court's interpretation of
the amended statute allowed, the testator's wishes were disregarded.
The court explained its reasoning as follows:
We point out that while the result of the statute seems to be
illogical in cases where both the last will and the next to the last will
are executed within six months of the death of testator, it is not so in
those cases where the next to the last will is executed at least six
months prior to the death of the testator. In any event it cannot be
said that the results produced by a literal interpretation of the statute
were not intended and foreseen by the legislature."
B. Questions of Standing
Since they had already determined that a charitable devise was void-
able by the heirs of the testator, the Florida courts soon had to decide
if there were situations in which those heirs were without standing to
challenge the bequests. In In re Estate of Lane, 10 the court reaffirmed
earlier statements from Taylor that voided bequests should pass
through the residuary clause of the will and not through the laws of
intestate succession. In so holding, the court employed a tactic that is
paradoxical in the context of mortmain statutes: stating that the stat-
ute "must always be read in the light of the intent of the testator."''
Of course, the very premise on which mortmain statutes are based is
that the intent of the testator should not be dispositive.
The result of passing the voided bequest through the residuary
clause is evident where a friend or collateral relative is named as the
residuary beneficiary. 02 If a voided bequest passes through the residu-
ary clause of the will, a testator can structure the will to eliminate any
economic incentive for a spouse or heir to challenge the will. This
could affect a spouse or heir's standing as evidenced by In re Estate of
Shameia.103 There, the court held that a daughter, who would have
been the testator's heir, had no standing to challenge a charitable de-
vise where the residuary clause named a collateral relative as benefici-
99. Blankenship, 122 So. 2d at 469.
100. 186 So. 2d 257, 259 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966).
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., In re Estate of Shameia, 257 So. 2d 77, 78 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972).
103. 257 So. 2d 77, 78 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972).
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ary.'10 As the residuary beneficiary was not among the class of people
named as protected by Florida's statute, and as those named in the
statute were denied standing by the court, the charitable devise was
allowed to stand because no one had the power of avoidance. 0 5
C. Constitutionality
After Taylor v. Payne,1° no court seriously addressed the constitu-
tionality of the Florida mortmain statute until Zrillic. Each case in
which the issue was raised merely cited Taylor without any substantial
discussion. One of the more recent examples of this was in 1984 in
Arthritis Foundation v. Beisse.18 The entire opinion of Arthritis
Foundation is as follows:
Appellants challenge the constitutionality of Section 732.803,
Florida Statutes (1983). We hold that Section 732.803 is
constitutional under the authority of Taylor v. Payne, 154 Fla. 359,
17 So. 2d 615 (1944), appeal dismissed, 323 U.S. 666, 65 S. Ct. 49,
89 L. Ed. 541 (1944), rehearing denied, 323 U.S. 813, 65 S. Ct. 113,
89 L. Ed. 647 (1944).
Affirmed.1 9
IV. FLORIDA STRIKES ITS MORTMAIN STATUTE: SHRINERS HOSPITALS
FOR CRIPPLED CHILDREN V. ZRLLIC
Finally, in May of 1990, the Florida Supreme Court revisited the
constitutionality of the state's mortmain statute in Zrillic."0 This re-
sulted in an opinion by Justice Rosemary Barkett in which the Su-
preme Court reversed the Fifth District Court of Appeal"' and held
that Florida's mortmain statute violated both the federal and state
constitutions. There are two main parts to the opinion: Justice Bar-
kett's majority opinion and Justice Parker Lee McDonald's opinion
concurring in the result and dissenting in put.'1 2
104. Id.
105. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
106. 154 Fla. 359, 17 So. 2d 615 (1944).
107. 563 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1990).
108. 456 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
109. Id.
110. 563 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1990).
111. The opinion of the Fifth District Court of Appeals is reported at Zrillic v. Estate of
Romans, 535 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), revd 563 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1990).
112. There was also a brief concurrence by Justice Stephen Grimes, but he did not go into
great detail in his two paragraph opinion. See Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 71.
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A. The Facts of Zrillic
Lorraine Romans executed her last will on May 5, 1986." 3 In this
will, Ms. Romans expressly limited the inheritance of her daughter
Lorraine Zrillic, the respondent, to "several sealed boxes of family
antique dishes and figurines. ' 1 4 As the residuary beneficiary of her
will, Ms. Romans designated Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Chil-
dren, one of the petitioners. 5
Ms. Romans died on July 19, 1986, less than six months after the
execution of her will.116 Ms. Zrillic requested the circuit court to issue
an order voiding the charitable devise provision of her mother's
will." 7 Responses were filed by Shriners Hospitals and the copersonal
representatives of Ms. Romans' estate."" These respondents filed af-
firmative defenses alleging that Ms. Zrillic lacked standing to void the
charitable devise because she was expressly disinherited and also alleg-
ing that Florida's mortmain statute was unconstitutional." 9 The cir-
cuit court granted Ms. Zrillic standing to challenge the charitable
devise of her mother's will but held the mortmain statute which al-
lowed her to do so unconstitutional.'2 Both parties appealed.' 2
B. The District Court Opinion
The opinion of the Fifth District Court of Appeal is reminiscent of
Arthritis Foundation v. Beisse, '2 in which the court merely relied on
the findings of constitutionality from earlier cases. 23 In this manner,
the district court reversed the circuit court's holding that the statute
violated the equal protection clauses of both the federal and state con-
stitutions. 124
113. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 65.
114. Mrs. Romans' will stated in part:
I have intentionally limited her inheritance since I have contributed substantially dur-
ing my life for her education and subsequent monies I have been required to expend
primarily due to her promiscuous type of life. My daughter, LORRAINE E. ZRILLIC
has not shown or indicated the slightest affection or gratitude for at least five years





118, Id. at 65-66.
119. Id. at 66.
120, Id.
121, Id.
122. 456 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
123. Zrillic v. Estate of Romans, 535 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), rev'd 563 So. 2d 64
(Fla. 1990).
124. Id. at 294.
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C. The Supreme Court's Majority Opinion
In the majority opinion, Justice Barkett recognized two issues to be
resolved: "The threshold question is whether a lineal descendant,
whose legacy was expressly limited by the decedent's will, has standing
to set aside a charitable devise in that will. The second question con-
cerns the constitutionality of section 732.803."1125
1. Standing
The court set forth two elements that Ms. Zrillic needed to satisfy
before she could be granted standing. 26 First, she needed to be a lineal
descendant of the testator. 27 This element was admitted by the peti-
tioners.1 28 Second, Ms. Zrillic had to be eligible to receive an interest
in the devise, if voided. 29
After identifying this second element as necessary for standing, the
court unconvincingly established that Ms. Zrillic cleared this hurdle:
The general rule of construction is that the intent of the testator
prevails. § 732.6005(1), Fla. Stat. (1985). However, allowing the
testator's intent to control construction of section 732.803 would
defeat both the plain meaning and the logic of the statute. Section
732.803 would serve no purpose if Zrillic is denied standing because
the statute's only logical use is to give standing to one who otherwise
would be deprived of a legacy. Any other conclusion would have the
practical effect of denying everybody the right to contest such a will.
Clearly the legislature must have intended the general rule of
construction in section 732.6005(1) to give way to the specific,
contrary purpose of section 732.803. Thus, we agree with the district
court that Zrillic had standing to petition to avoid the devise. 3'
Perhaps a better way to reach this result would have been to look to
the impact on the testator's estate if the charitable bequest was
voided. In that event, the residue would pass through the intestacy
statutes to Ms. Romans' heirs, including Ms. Zrillic.' 31 Since standing
is to be given to one who will inherit in the event the bequest is





130. Id. (citations omitted).
131. See FLA. STAT. §§ 732.101 & .103 (1989).
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voided,"32 Ms. Zrillic's standing is clear. While it is true that section
732.6005(1) provides that the intent of the testator should govern, the
testator's intent is irrelevant regarding the inheritance by heirs in cases
involving total or partial intestacy. 33
2. The Constitutional Issues
After granting Ms. Zrillic standing, the court addressed the consti-
tutionality of the mortmain statute.34 Two constitutional issues were
discussed by the court: whether the statute "imposes an unreasonable
restriction on a property owner's right to dispose of property by
will,'" "3 as guaranteed by the state constitution, 36 and whether the
statute violates the equal protection clauses of the federa' 37 and
state 38 constitutions. 39
(a) Unreasonable Restriction on the Right to Will Property
The first step in this analysis is to determine whether the ability to
dispose of property by will is a constitutionally protected right."'0 In
what is arguably one of the most important aspects of this case, the
court held that such a right is protected by article I, section 2 of the
Florida Constitution.' 4' After the court made a "common sense read-
132. 563 So. 2d at 66.
133. See, e.g., In re Estate of Barker, 448 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), in which expressly
disinherited heirs were allowed to take under the intestacy statutes where the failure of the resid-
uary clause resulted in partial intestacy:
In order to cut off an heir's right to succession a testator must do more than merely
evince an intention that the heir shall not share in the estate-he must make a valid
disposition of his property.... Accordingly, where some of the property is not dis-
posed of by will, either because of the lapse of proposed legacies or for other reasons,
the cases hold that the undisposed-of property will pass to those entitled under the
statutes of descent, both where language in the will attempts to exclude such persons
altogether from the benefits of the estate, and where the testator does make some
provision for the person in question but specifies that such provision shall be all that
such person is to receive.
Id. at 31.
134. 563 So. 2d at 66-71.
135. Id. at 66-69.
136. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
137. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
138. FLA. CONST. art. I, §2.
139. 563 So. 2d at 69-70.
140. See Taylor v. Payne, 154 Fla. 359, 17 So. 2d 615, 617 (1944); supra note 82 and accom-
panying text.
141. 563 So. 2d at 67.
SECTION 2. Basic rights. - All natural persons are equal before the law and have
inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to
pursue happiness, to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and protect
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ing of the plain and ordinary meaning of the language"' 142 of the con-
stitutional provisions, it concluded that the carving out of an
exception allowing regulation of inheritance and disposition rights of
aliens indicates that those rights were protected as to everyone else,
and therefore, subject only to reasonably necessary restrictions. 143
With regard to the authority holding that such testamentary rights
are not constitutionally protected in our society, the court pointed out
that such conclusions were based on notions of feudal law.'" Thus, if
those feudal notions are inapplicable, the traditional distinction be-
tween "property" rights, which have always been protected, and "tes-
tamentary" rights, which have traditionally been viewed as
unprotected, becomes irrelevant. 45
This distinction
is inapplicable in our society where feudalism never existed and
where property rights rest on an express constitutional foundation
that is distinguishable from the common law roots of feudal
England. Yet all too often courts have failed to thoroughly analyze
the distinction, instead giving unquestioning allegiance to an
antiquated way of thinking.' s
The next step of the court's analysis involved determining whether
the restrictions placed by the mortmain statute on this constitutional
right were reasonably necessary. 47 Once again, the court cited the feu-
dal origins of the mortmain statute and held that such restrictions on
modern bequests are no longer reasonably necessary,'" and are there-
fore unconstitutional. 49
This lack of modern reasonable necessity is even more apparent
given that Florida already has other constitutional and statutory pro-
tections for disinherited family members, who may be dependent or in
financial need.5 0 For example, there are homestead exemptions from
property; except that the ownership, inheritance, disposition and possession of real
property by aliens ineligible for citizenship may be regulated or prohibited by law. No
person shall be deprived of any right because of race, religion or physical handicap.
FLA. CoNsT. art I, § 2 (emphasis added by court).




146. Id. at 68.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 68-69.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 69.
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the bequest of real and personal property,"' a coverture restriction, 5 2
provisions for an elective share,"13 personal property exemptions, 5 4
and a family allowance.'" Also, the fear of unscrupulous charities
taking advantage of testators who face impending death is alleviated
by statutes voiding bequests procured by "fraud, duress, mistake, or
undue influence,' 5 6 and requiring that the testator be competent to
execute such a will. 57
The court noted the existence of these protections for the testator's
family, while stating that the mortmain statute does not adequately
serve its avowed purpose:
No similar protections are assured by section 732.803. To the
contrary, the charitable devise restriction fails to protect against
windfalls for lineal descendants who have had no contact with the
decedent or who have been neglectful or abusive to the decedent but
who may benefit from the avoidance of a charitable devise. It also
fails to protect against windfalls for lineal descendants whose legacy
was specifically limited by the decedent. Another significant flaw is
that artful will drafting easily defeats the effect of the statute: If the
testator names anybody other than a spouse or lineal descendent to
take the charitable devise in the event the charitable devise fails,
nobody would have standing to petition to avoid the charitable
devise. 58
(b) Equal Protection
The other basis on which the court held the mortmain statute un-
constitutional is that it violates the equal protection clauses of the fed-
eral and state constitutions.5 9 There are two different standards of
inquiry that the courts utilize in equal protection analyses. If funda-
mental rights are limited, the law must be found to promote an "over-
riding or compelling interest of government" to be held valid. 16 If the
regulation deals merely with economics or social welfare, the test is
151. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4; FLA. STAT. §§ 732.401.4015 (1989).
152. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 5; Fla. Stat. § 732.111 (1989).
153. FLA. STAT. §§ 732.201-.215 (1989).
154. Id. § 732.402 (1989).
155. Id. § 732.403 (1989).
156. Id. § 732.5165 (1989).
157. Id. § 732.501 (1989); see Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 69.
158. 563 So. 2d at 69 (citation omitted). This statement seems particularly ironic given the
court's earlier granting of standing to Ms. Zrillic. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
159. Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
160. J. Now.K, R. ROTUNDA, J. Youto, CoNsTrUoNAL LAw 524 (3d ed. 1986).
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whether the law "rationally relate[s] to a legitimate governmental pur-
pose." ' 16' The Zrillic court applied the less stringent rational relation-
ship test, but noted that it probably could have applied the more
stringent test given its earlier finding that the right to devise property
is now a constitutionally protected fundamental right in Florida. 62
The court found that the statute creates classifications of people that
are both too narrow and too broad, and that it therefore fails to es-
tablish a "rational distinction having a just and reasonable relation to
a legitimate state objective. ' 163
The statute is too narrow because it does not provide for the avoid-
ance of bequests made to parties who are not named in the statute,
but who may be in an equal or superior position to those named to
influence deathbed bequests to themselves." Additionally, it does not
affect many charitable gifts made without proper deliberation where
such a bequest was made more than six months before the death of
the testator. 65 The statute is too broad because many bequests may be
voided that were not impermissibly influenced or where there are no
family members in need of protection.'"6
The court summarized its equal protection holding as follows:
There is no rational distinction to automatically void a devise upon
request when the testator survives the execution of the will by five
months and twenty-eight days, but not when the testator survives a
few days longer. Nor is it rational to apply the statute in cases where
the testator dies suddenly due to an accident during the six-month
period after making the charitable bequest.
The effect of section 732.803 is to defeat the testator's express
intent without any reasonable relation to the evil sought to be
161. Id.
162. 563 So. 2d at 70 n.6. Although the court said it was applying a mere rational relation-
ship test, it appears that the level of scrutiny actually applied was more stringent than the highly
deferential standard that is usually implicated in the rational relationship test. See United States
R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980), in which the Court seemed to say that the
rational relationship test will virtually always result in upholding the statute if there are "plausi-
ble reasons" for the legislature's enactment of the statute. Id. at 179. However, it is possible that
the Florida Supreme Court actually did apply a rational relationship test, but defined that test as
did the dissenters in Fritz to require actual scrutiny of the statute even where "plausible reasons"
for the legislation may be presented. Id. at 179, 182-198 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
163. 563 So. 2d at 69 (quoting Palm Harbor Special Fire Control Dist. v. Kelly, 516 So. 2d
249, 251 (Fla. 1987)).
164. "The statute does not protect against overreaching by unscrupulous lawyers, doctors,
nurses, housekeepers, companions, or others with a greater opportunity to influence a testator.
There is no reason to believe that testators need more protection against charities than against
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cured .... The classification established in section 732.803 does not
draw a rational distinction, and it is neither just nor reasonably
related to a legitimate governmental purpose.167
3. Concurrence by Justice McDonald
Justice McDonald concurred only in the sense that he, too, would
deny Ms. Zrillic the relief that she seeks. 6 He contended that Ms.
Zrillic should be denied standing. 69 In response to the majority's
holding of unconstitutionality, 70 Justice McDonald discussed the rea-
sons that Florida's mortmain statute should once again be held consti-
tutional.17'
Justice McDonald's based his belief that Ms. Zrillic should be de-
nied standing to challenge the charitable bequest upon his reading of
section 732.6005(1), Florida Statutes (1985).172 That statute provides:
"The intention of the testator as expressed in his will controls the le-
gal effect of his dispositions. The rules of construction expressed in
this part shall apply unless a contrary intention is indicated by the
will.173 He stated that the clear intent of Ms. Romans should be
given great deference, particularly where, as here, there are other lin-
eal descendants who could take the property if the charitable bequest
were voided, and those other lineal descendants have not been ex-
pressly disinherited. 7 Based upon this deference to the testator's in-
tent, Justice McDonald felt that the only parties who could effectively
challenge Ms. Romans' charitable bequests were her grandchildren. 75
Therefore, he concluded that Ms. Zrillic should be denied standing
and that, unless the grandchildren brought suit to challenge the chari-
table bequests, the charitable provisions of the will should not be
modified by the court. 7 6
167. Id. (citations omitted).
168. 563 So. 2d at 71-73 (J. McDonald, joined by J. Overton, concurring in the result and
dissenting in part).
169. Id. at 71.
170. Id. at 71-73.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 71.
173. FLA. STAT. § 732.6005(1) (1985).
174. 563 So. 2d at 71. Justice McDonald noted that Ms. Romans left grandchildren who
were not expressly disinherited.
175. Id.
176. Id. It is unclear how far Justice McDonald would take this principle of deferring to the
testator's intent in cases of partial, or even total, intestacy. There may be other cases in which
the intent of the testator is clear in a purported will but intestacy results because of faulty draft-
ing or execution. For example, had Ms. Zrillic tried to raise a question about whether the will
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As to the constitutionality of Florida's mortmain statute, Justice
McDonald relied heavily on precedent to support his opinion that the
statute is constitutional.17  Citing Taylor v. Payne,17 8 Justice Mc-
Donald addressed the statutory nature of the right to bequeath prop-
erty and found that such a right is not guaranteed by the "organic
law.' ' 179 Therefore, he stated that the right to pass property by will is
subject to absolute regulation by the legislature, including the legisla-
ture's right to totally abolish that right.' 8° Justice McDonald found no
constitutional or societal changes that had occurred since Taylor in
1944, which would justify reversing its mandate. 8'
Although Justice McDonald acknowledged that "the facts of this
case are not attractive for application of the statute,"'' 82 he believes
that the statute may be appropriate in some factual situations:
"Surely one would have to say that, had the testator, in her last few
days, succumbed to a television evangelist's call to be with the Lord
by delivering her property to his church and thus leave unprotected a
physically handicapped child, a rational basis for the statute would
exist.' ' 83 However, Justice McDonald did not discuss the potential
equal protection problems that may result from his realization that the
state's mortmain statute may be over-broad.
Nevertheless, according to Justice McDonald, the Legislature's
right to set limitations on devises of property overcomes any problems
with the statute.'84 "It may be that in today's society the legislature
should not effect legislation like section 782.803, but that is for it to
decide. Our role is to decide whether the legislature could do so and,
contrary to the majority's views, I believe it can."1 85
V. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The Florida Supreme Court's comments about past decisions giving
"unquestioning allegiance to an antiquated way of thinking' '1 86 re-
was properly attested by the testator in the presence of the witnesses, it appears unclear whether
Justice McDonald would deny her standing based on the clear intention of the testator that she
be disinherited. See FLA. STAT. § 732.502(1)(b)2 (1989). See also supra note 133 and accompany-
ing text.
177. Id. at 71-73.
178. 154 Fla. 359, 17 So. 2d 615 (1944).
179. 563 So. 2d at 72.
180. Id. at 72-73.
181. Id. at 73.
182. Id. at 72.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. (emphasis in original).
186. Id. at 68.
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garding feudal traditions in our modern law may leave some questions
as to the vulnerability of other artifacts from feudal times. For exam-
ple, such concepts as the Rule against Perpetuities 8 7 may be subject to
a stricter analysis regarding their constitutional applicability to mod-
ern times.' Such an abolition may not be as extreme as it may seem,
as at least three states have already abolished the common law Rule
against Perpetuities.' 9 However, because of the potential havoc such
changes could wreak on the estate tax laws, this may be a controversy
the Florida courts will wish to avoid. 190
The abolition of the state's mortmain statute is not likely to have
great impact on the drafting of wills in Florida.' 9' While charitable
organizations may benefit somewhat and the intent of the testator
may be better protected, it is not likely that there will be any large-
scale effects. The relatively small number of cases that have been re-
ported during the Florida statute's history seems to indicate that its
provisions have not been violated very often. Nevertheless, there is
now one less statutory trap of which the careful will drafter must be
aware.192
It is possible, however, that the legislature may believe that some
restrictions on death-bed bequests are desirable to prevent improvi-
dent gifts to the detriment of the testator's family. 93 Given the deci-
sion in Zrillic, there may not be any way that section 732.803 could be
modified to pass constitutional muster, even if the legislature chose to
do so.19
Arguably, the equal protection arguments could be addressed fairly
easily by modifying the scope of those bequests that would be voida-
ble. For example, where the death is caused by an accident, charitable
bequests might not be voidable. Also, any charitable bequests that
187. FLA. STAT. § 689.225 (1989).
188. For a discussion of the comparison between mortmain statutes and the Rule against
Perpetuities see Hornstein, Corporate Control and Private Property Rules, 92 U. PA. L. Rav. 1,
11-12 (1943) ("The Law of Mortmain was designed to prevent too much land getting into the
power of a single, undying owner... The Rule against Perpetuities, in turn, endeavored to pre-
vent wealth being kept in certain directed channels for too long a time[.J" (emphasis in origi-
nal)).
189. Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (1990); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-5-8
(1983); Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.16 (1981 & Supp. 1989).
190. See J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOSANSON, WiLs, TRUSTS, & ESTATES 867 (3d ed. 1984).
191. See White, Remember the Mortmain, 56 FLA. B.J. 853 (1982).
192. Id.
193. See supra note 183 and accompanying text for Justice McDonald's discussion of when
such a restriction may be desirable.
194. It is not entirely unlikely that the legislature would choose to do so given that the statute
has not been repealed despite it having been found constitutional as recently as 1984 in Arthritis
Foundation v. Beisse, 456 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
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had been continuously in the testator's wills dating back at least six
months before the testator's death might not be voidable. Other simi-
lar changes could be made to section 732.803 that would allow that
statute to pass equal protection muster on all points raised by the
Florida Supreme Court.'9
However, it may not be possible for the mortmain statute to be so
modified as to respect the fundamental right to will property that is
now found in the Florida Constitution.'" This analysis is supported
by the court's statement that, "neither the ancient purpose nor the
modern justification underlying the restriction on charitable devises is
well served by section 732.803. The statute is not reasonably necessary
to accomplish the asserted state goals at the cost of offending prop-
erty interests protected by the Florida Constitution."' This seemingly
thorough condemnation of restrictions of this type indicates that there
may be no possible change that would serve an effective purpose and
still satisfy the majority of the Florida Supreme Court. It will be diffi-
cult to overcome the court's decision that the purposes for which the
mortmain statute was intended are not legitimate state purposes. 98
For example, the legislature would be hard-pressed to modify the stat-
ute in such a way that would protect against over-reaching charities,
protect needy dependents, and still "protect against windfalls for lin-
eal descendants who have had no contact with the decedent or who
have been neglectful or abusive to the decedent but who may benefit
from the avoidance of a charitable devise."' 1 Furthermore, it would
be difficult for a statute to "protect against windfalls for lineal de-
scendants whose legacy was specifically limited by the decedent," 200
while closing loopholes through which careful drafting could carry the
will.201
VI. CONCLUSION
It is unclear whether the approach taken by the court in Zrillic was
ideal for effectively resolving the problems with the state's mortmain
statute while still serving the objectives for which it was intended.
That the statute was held to violate the equal protection clauses of the
federal and state constitutions was consistent with what other states
195. 563 So. 2d at 69-71.
196. Id. at 66-69.
197. Id.
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have held and reasonably justified given the over- and under-inclusive-
ness of the statute. However, the court's holding that there is state
constitutional right to devise property may not have been as well-ad-
vised. It seems as though it effectively precludes the legislature from
modifying the mortmain statute to accomplish those goals that may
arguably be socially desirable. More importantly, though, this newly-
revealed constitutional right may spawn challenges to other statutory
limitations on the right to dispose of property by will. It will be inter-
esting to watch the impact that Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Chil-
dren v. Zrillic will have in the years to come.
